Robert Stalnaker's theory of conditionals: "Intuitively, the value of the [conditional's selection] function should be that world in which the antecedent is true which is most similar, in relevant respects, to the actual world" (, ).
'Limit violations' can make limit assuming theories go badly awry. Take Lewis's theory of counterparts, for example. If for every potential counterpart of o in world w there is another that does better qua potential counterpart of o, then there are no elements of the maximal order on potential o-counterparts that are at least as good qua potential counterparts of o as any other elements of the order. In such a case the limit assuming nature of Lewis's theory-again, it looks for objects in w that "resemble [o] no less closely than do other things existing there"-means that according to Lewis o has no counterparts at w. So Lewis has no analysis of de re modal claims about how things are with o at w. But, as I argue here, we may have robust and clear judgments about how things are with o at w.
Other limit assuming theories are vulnerable to similar cases. In light of this the extensive debate over the limit assumption for counterfactuals looks parochial at best. Limit violations threaten so many different theories that piecemeal responses do not suffice.
Here I introduce and develop a very general technique that allows any limit assuming theory to handle limit violations. Ordering supervaluationism, as I call it, adds a partial preorder to the resources of ordinary supervaluationism. Just as ordinary supervaluationism is a general purpose strategy to be deployed when various candidate interpretations of an expression are tied for best, ordering supervaluationism is a general purpose strategy to be deployed when for each of the various candidate interpretations of an expression another is better. And it does no harm to appeal to ordering supervaluationism, with an appropriate preorder, when we would usually use ordinary supervaluationism.
Just as ordinary supervaluationism helps us save and generalize 'uniqueness assuming' theories, ordering supervaluationism helps us save limit assuming theories. With so many otherwise attractive limit assuming theories, this is a sensible, methodologically conservative approach.
Section  presents motivating examples from counterpart theory in detail, and section  explains why revisionary semantic and ordinary supervaluationist approaches are unattractive. Sections  and Matti Eklund's view on interpretation has similar formal requirements, despite its very different motivations. For example, Eklund writes that "the semantic values are whatever comes closest to satisfying the conditions laid down by the [possibly inconsistent] senses" (b, ; see also his a, -, and much of his later work).
Cf. Ted Sider's characterization of "no fact of the matter" philosophical disputes (a, -).
 lay out ordering supervaluationism and use it to generalize some important limit assuming theories.
Finally, section  argues that the application of ordering supervaluationism can make a difference to some standing philosophical debates. What if there is "ever-deeper novel structure" (S , ) ? What if "matter is in nitely divisible, with different properties at each level" (B , ) ? What if "things get ever more basic without limit" (S , ) ? ese questions are as intrinsically interesting to the ordering supervaluationist as they are to anyone. But appeal to ordering supervaluationism can mitigate the impact of their answers on the practice of metaphysics.
. Limit violations in counterpart theory
It is helpful to begin to think about ordering supervaluationism in the context of Lewisian theories of de re modality. is is because it is easy to see how ordering supervaluationism handles counterpart theoretic limit violations, and the relevant orderings are relatively well understood. My aim here is not to defend counterpart theory; it is rather to display the virtues of ordering supervaluationism by applying it on behalf of counterpart theorists.
Suppose that for some rational number n Al is now exactly n millimeters tall. () Al is at least n − 2 millimeters tall in w I .
And () also seems true, because some potential Al counterpart (for example, w I -Al-
) is such that all the potential Al counterparts that resemble Al at least as well as that potential Al counterpart does are at least n − 0.5 millimeters tall.
() Al is at least n − 0.5 millimeters tall in w I .
Contrast these with some claims that seem false.
() Al's height measured in millimeters is a rational number in w I .
As we consider potential Al counterparts in w I that more and more closely resemble Al, we never come to a potential Al counterpart such that all potential Al counterparts that resemble Al at least as well are of a height that is rational when measured in millimeters. Suppose someone argued that () is true, on the grounds that the height of w I -Al-1 √ 100 100 measured in millimeters is a rational number, and that surely w I -Al-1 √ 100 100 resembles Al closely enough to be relevant to the question of whether () is true. e obvious and apt response is that the height of someone in w I who still better resembles Al is an irrational number when measured in millimeters. So () is false. And () is also false, for analogous reasons.
() Al's height measured in millimeters is an irrational number in w I .
On Lewis's theory ()-() are all anomalous in exactly the same way, because Al simply does not have any counterparts in w I . Finally, we want a theory that reconciles the falsity of () and () with the truth of ().  () Al's height measured in millimeters in w I is a rational or an irrational number.
Here is one more example. First, consider a possible world w that contains exactly one universe-call it U-with a beginning but not an end. Take some nite duration of time (a year, say) and partition the event that is the life of U into year long events, enumerated by the positive integers:
year , year , year , and so on. Consider another possible world w ′ that contains a sequence of innitely many universes, each of which is nite in duration although the whole sequence of universes has a beginning but not an end. e life of the rst universe exactly resembles U's year , the life of the second universe exactly resembles U's years  and , the life of the third universe exactly resembles U's years  and  and , and so on. Suppose that some of the universes in w ′ resemble U well enough that they would count as U's counterpart if they were not beaten by another universe in w ′ . Nevertheless U has no counterpart in w ′ , according to Lewis's theory. But we want claims like
to be true for every positive integer n. Note also that this judgment shows that in limit violating cases we should not just take the set of potential counterparts of o to be those that resemble o 'well enough. '
If we did, then for in nitely many positive integers () would be false.
. Some problems for semantic and ordinary supervaluationist treatments
Lewis famously accommodates limit violations for counterfactuals within his semantics for counterfactuals. In Counterfactuals he presents his semantics in terms of a system of spheres centered on the world of evaluation, where
Any particular sphere around a world i is to contain just those worlds that resemble i to at least a certain degree. … e smaller the sphere, the more similar to i must a world be to fall within it. To say the same thing in purely comparative terms: whenever one world lies within some sphere around i and another world lies outside that sphere, the rst world is more closely similar to i than the second. (, )
Lewis does not need to make the limit assumption, because his semantics allows for the possibility that there is an "in nite descending sequence of smaller and smaller spheres without end" ().
A counterfactual is "non-vacuously true if there is some antecedent-permitting sphere in which the consequent holds at every antecedent-world" ().⁴ Contrast Lewis's actual semantics with one according to which a counterfactual is non-vacuously true iff all the antecedent-worlds in the smallest ⁴A sphere is antecedent-permitting iff it contains some world in which the antecedent is true.
 sphere that contains an antecedent-world are also consequent-worlds. Such a semantics is obviously limit assuming, since it delivers the verdict that a given counterfactual is true only if there is a smallest antecedent-permitting sphere.
It is natural to ask whether Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals could be adapted into a semantics for de re modal claims. On this line, we would analyze () as saying that there is some candidate for o-counterparthood in w such that every at least as good candidate for o-counterparthood in w is F in w.
Such a semantics would get the right results about examples ()-(). Indeed, it turns out that a similar semantics deems a given de re modal claim true exactly when ordering supervaluationism deems it ordering supertrue. And although semantic approaches introduce a fair amount of machinery into the semantic theory of de re modal claims, ordering supervaluationism introduces essentially the same machinery. So one might think that the two approaches are in a standoff.
e problem for semantic approaches is that on a comprehensive semantic approach, the same basic machinery will have to show up in the semantics over and over again. We cannot stop at de re claims: we must also handle 'is a law of nature, ' 'is a charitable interpretation, ' 'is the right thing to do, '
and so on, for whatever limit assuming theories we might endorse. While the theorist who handles limit violations in her semantics applies the same basic principles that the ordering supervaluationist does, she applies them anew in each of many different places. By contrast, ordering supervaluationism gives a single mechanism that we can appeal to whenever we need to generalize a limit assuming theory to accommodate limit violations. For an analogy, consider the proposal that (for some vague
It is totally uncontroversial that ordinary supervaluationism improves on this kind of semantic approach to vagueness by being more general and more economical. Ordering supervaluationism improves on the semantic approach mooted above in just these respects.
Supervaluating in the usual way is also unsatisfactory. Suppose we kept Lewis's semantics for de re claims, but looked to "what is common to all or most ways (or all or most reasonable ways)
of making the choice" between candidates for o-counterparthood in w, "caring little what happens on any particular way of making" the choice (L , ) . An analogous strategy is roundly dismissed in the literature on counterfactuals, and with good reason: if we supervaluate, and "if ever there were closer and closer antecedent-worlds without end, there would be no admissible selection functions at all" (L , ). Stalnaker agrees:
… if the limit assumption were to fail, there would be too few candidates to be the selec- tion function rather than too many. Any selection function would be forced to choose worlds which were less similar to the actual world than other eligible worlds. is is why the supervaluation method does not provide a way to avoid making the limit assumption.
( S , ) e analogous problem for de re claims is that it is wrong to admit interpretations according to which o's counterpart in w is an object that is less similar to o than other eligible objects in w. Stalnaker and his followers do argue that there are no limit violations for counterfactuals. But those arguments are irrelevant to the possibility of limit violations for counterpart theory and other limit assuming theories. For example, anyone who thinks that (as is plausible) it might have been that there were in nitely many things better and better resembling Al ipso facto admits that there are limit violating cases for Lewis's analysis of counterparthood.
Recently  F  and  and G  have diverged from Lewis and Stalnaker by defending "strict" analyses of counterfactuals. Because von Fintel endorses the limit assumption (, ; , -, fn. )-indeed, it is a crucial part of his dynamics of the modal horizon (, ; , -)-his analysis is not immediately helpful in the current setting. Likewise for Gillies' analysis.⁵ But Gillies is circumspect about the limit assumption where possible, and some of the ways in which he is circumspect might encourage the following thought: the counterfactual ' A > C ' is true at i iff every A-world that resembles i at least as well as some A-world privileged by the context of utterance is a C-world. If we adapted this kind of story to de re claims, () (i.e., 'In w, o is F ') might be analyzed as ascribing F-ness to every object in w that is at least as good a candidate for ocounterparthood as some object in w privileged by the context of utterance. is particular account is semantic, and is thus subject to the same objection I made earlier: the same tweak will need to be made over and over again throughout our semantic theory, instead of just once, in the supervaluationist scaffolding. But the thought behind this semantic approach could be put in supervaluationist terms by permitting an object to be an admissible 'counterpart' for o in w iff it is in w and is at least as good a candidate for o-counterparthood as some object in w privileged by the context of utterance.
Such accounts have the further problem that they ask a lot of context: it is hard to see how context could pick out the right privileged world to underwrite truth-conditions that match our intuitions (P , ) . And recall schemas like (): 'In w ′ , U includes year n. ' No possible world makes () come out true for every positive integer n. Finally, the demands on context become even more pressing if we drop the assumption that the relevant preorder is total. And the totality assumption is something we should avoid: given how many comparatives look partial,⁶ there is every reason to ⁵For example: "s◊φ = s ′ iff s ′ is the smallest set in Di such that s ⊆ s ′ and s ′ ∩ φ ≠ ∅" (). ⁶See (e.g.) MC-G , -, K , C , , and K .  think that 'resembles at least as well as' is also partial. But if we were to supervaluate in the way just sketched, the context would, in general, need to privilege more than one world for merely partial preorders-in some cases very many worlds, and in some cases even in nitely many worlds.
. Ordering supervaluationism for total preorders
An analysis of counterfactuals is strict if, according to it, a counterfactual "is a material conditional preceded by some sort of necessity operator: ◻(φ ⊃ ψ), " where '◻' "acts like a restricted universal quanti er over possible worlds" (L , ) . e deployment of a restricted universal quanti er is the feature of strict analyses of counterfactuals that I want to focus on here, for traditional supervaluationism also deploys a restricted universal quanti er. In particular, according to traditional supervaluationism, a sentence is supertrue iff it is true according to every admissible interpretation ( F , -).
Strict analyses of counterfactuals are distinguished from variably strict analyses by the fact that, on variably strict analyses, "we do not need to choose" the domain over which the universal quanti er quanti es (L , ) . A fortiori, context does not need to choose that domain. On a strict semantics for counterfactuals, the truth of a counterfactual turns on whether every world in an antecedently determined set has a particular feature. On a variably strict semantics, by contrast, the truth of a counterfactual turns on whether there is some lower bound within which every world has a particular feature (S ) . ought of at a fairly high level of abstraction, ordering supervaluationism enriches ordinary supervaluationism in just the way that variably strict semantics for counterfactuals enrich ordinary strict semantics for counterfactuals. More precisely, ordering supervaluationism and variably strict semantics for counterfactuals both ask whether a given preorder has a lower bound within which all the elements of the preorder share some property. Accordingly, a sentence is supertrue according to ordering supervaluationism iff there is some lower bound on interpretations such that the sentence is true according to every interpretation within that bound. is core thought could be implemented in a variety of ways. So although for brevity I will sometimes speak as if the particular theory I offer here just is ordering supervaluationism, and nothing else counts, I think it is better to think of ordering supervaluationism as a family of closely related theories rather than as a particular theory. e particular theory I offer here is the product of a range of choices, some of which are wholly unforced, and many of which are driven by considerations about simplicity or aesthetics.
Lower bounds in total preorders are extremely simple: any element that is ordered by a total preorder is in effect a lower bound for that preorder. () Al is at least n − 2 millimeters tall in w I .
() Al's height measured in millimeters in w I is a rational or an irrational number.
e preorder of interpretations of ()-call it '≲ (1) '-is closely related to the preorder on candidates to be Al's counterpart. ≲ (1) privileges interpretation (ii) over interpretation (i), interpretation (iii) over interpretation (ii), and so on:
() (i) w−Al−1 is at least n − 2 millimeters tall in w I .
(
is at least n − 2 millimeters tall in w I .
⋮ () is ordering supertrue because some lower bound of ≲ (1) -for example, 'w−Al−1 is at least n − 2 millimeters tall in w I '-is such that every interpretation of () that is at least as ≲ (1) good as that lower bound is true. Similarly for (); it is ordering supertrue because some lower bound of ≲ (2) -for
is at least n − 0.5 millimeters tall in w I '-is such that every interpretation of () that is at least as ≲ (2) good that lower bound is true.
⁷It may sound a bit odd to call elements of total preorders 'lower bounds, ' but I nd that keeping this terminology consistent throughout makes it easier to see the similarities between my treatment of total preorders and my treatment of merely partial preorders.
() (i) w−Al−1 is at least n − 0.5 millimeters tall in w I .
is at least n − 0.5 millimeters tall in w I .
⋮
But neither () nor () is ordering supertrue. ere is no interpretation of (), for example, that marks a lower ≲ (3) bound on a set of interpretations of () all of which are true.
() (i) w−Al−1's height measured in millimeters is a rational number in w I .
(ii) w−Al− 's height measured in millimeters is a rational or an irrational number in w I .
⋮ e example that I sketched at the end of section  helps bring out some subtle but important distinctions that ordering supervaluationism is able to make. Imagine, again, an in nite sequence of universes, each of which is nitely long but is also longer than its immediate predecessor by a year.
Recall that we want () In w ′ , U includes year n.
to be ordering supertrue for every positive integer n. At the same time we want () not to be ordering supertrue, for no universe in w ′ includes every year in U.
() In w ′ , U includes every year n ∈ N.
Ordering supervaluationism makes these predictions. For any n ∈ N, the following preorder of interpretations contains a ≲ (6) lower bound of a set of true interpretations of ().
⁸is is the kernel of how to reconcile the validity of conditional excluded middle and limit assumption failures for conditionals (S x). () (i) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 1 includes year n.
(ii) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 2 includes year n.
(iii) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 3 includes year n.
But because there is no ≲ (8) lower bound such that every interpretation of () at least as ≲ (8) good as it is true, () is not ordering supertrue; indeed it is ordering superfalse.
() (i) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 1 includes every year n ∈ N.
(ii) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 2 includes every year n ∈ N.
(iii) In w ′ , w ′ − U − 3 includes every year n ∈ N.
⋮ e superfalsity of () re ects the fact that w ′ does not include any endless universes like U.
One important objection to theories of conditionals that do not make the limit assumption is that they generate counterexamples to what John Pollock calls the "Generalized Consequence Principle":
"If Γ is a set of sentences, and for each Q ∈ Γ, ⌜(P > Q)⌝ is true, and Γ → R, then ⌜(P > R)⌝ is true" (, ; cf. H ) . It might seem worrying that ordering supervaluationism generates counterexamples to the similar principle ():
() If Γ is a set of ordering supertrue sentences, and Γ → R, then R is ordering supertrue.
But our judgments about () and () show that this is in fact a strength of ordering supervaluationism.
e set of sentences consisting of every instance of () does entail (). But because our intuitions lead us to reject (), it is to the theory's credit that it is possible for every instance of () to be ordering supertrue without () being ordering supertrue. (If there are some similar inferences that we want to save, and we are facing a genuine limit violation, it may be helpful to appeal to something like S- 's notion of "reasonable inferences" in particular contexts.) Moreover, with preorders that do contain 'best' or 'tied for best' elements, ordering supervaluationism agrees with ordinary supervaluationism, so long as the best or tied for best elements are treated as the admissible interpretations for purposes of ordinary supervaluationism. In such cases ordering supertruth and ordinary supertruth both turn on whether the best or tied for best interpretations are all true. So ordering supervaluationism does not disrupt the successes of ordinary supervaluationism.
. Ordering supervaluationism for partial preorders
Earlier I alluded to the importance of merely partial preorders for counterpart theory and for comparatives more generally. Merely partial preorders represent not just relative ranking but also incom- parability: they represent some of their elements as being incomparable to each other, although they can compare those elements to other elements. And quite generally it is prudent to resist such assumptions, especially for limit assuming theories that are sensitive to more than one dimension of comparison. We should not assume that, for example, the preorders representing the simplicity and strength of "true deductive systems" (L , ) make every such system comparable to every other such system, or that the preorders representing the eligibility of referents and their t with theory make every interpretation of a language comparable to every other interpretation of that language.
De nition . A preorder that is not total with respect to a set S is
To handle merely partial preorders, we simply need to generalize our earlier way of thinking about lower bounds for total preorders. ere are various ways to think about lower bounds for partial preorders; I favor using cutsets.⁹
De nition . A set C is a chain of a preorder ≲ on a set S iff C ⊆ S and ≲ is total with respect to C. ⁰

De nition . A set C is a maximal chain of a preorder ≲ on a set S iff C is a chain of ≲ on S and no chain of ≲ on S properly includes C.
De nition . A set C is a cutset of a preorder ≲ on a set S iff C contains an element of each maximal chain of ≲ on S.
We supplement our earlier de nition of lower bounds for total preorders with the more general
De nition . B is a lower bound of a partial preorder ≲ on a set S iff B is a cutset of ≲ on S.
And, repeated from earlier,
De nition . 'φ' is ordering supertrue, relative to a preorder ≲ on a set possible interpretations of 'φ' S, iff there is some lower bound of ≲ on S such that every interpretation of 'φ' in S that is at least as ≲ good as that lower bound is true.
⁹In S  I show that maximal antichains play the role of lower bounds in the V /K /L  semantics for counterfactuals, and I explain why cutsets do a better job.
⁰I depart from standard usage in de ning standard order theoretic concepts in terms of mere preorders. For early work on cutsets see B & G  and G ; see also G . Some partially ordered sets lack minimal cutsets (H , L & R ) so minimal cutsets are not good candidates to be lower bounds.

For an interpretation i to be at least as ≲ good as a set of interpretations B is for i to be at least as ≲ good as some interpretation in B, and at least as ≲ good as every interpretation in B to which it is comparable. So 'φ' is ordering supertrue relative to ≲ iff there is some set, B, containing an interpretation from each maximal ≲ chain, such that if an interpretation of 'φ' is at least as ≲ good as every interpretation in B to which it is ≲ comparable, then that interpretation is true.
Here is an illustration of how ordering supervaluationism handles a merely partial preorder. Consider a possible world w with in nitely many people who closely resemble Betty. Call them 'Betty 1 , ' 'Betty −1 , ' 'Betty 2 , ' 'Betty −2 , ' … such that the negative numbered are all simply less quick-witted than Betty, the positive numbered are all simply better at solving mathematical problems than Betty, and the greater the absolute value of a name's subscript, the closer the bearer of that name is to Betty with respect to quick-wittedness or mathematical problem solving ability. (And, following Kamp, assume that the differences in quick-wittedness and mathematical problem solving ability here make for incomparability.) We want sentences like () to be true iff there is some integer m > 0 and some integer n < 0 such that for any Betty x such that x ≥ m and for any Betty y such that y ≤ n, Betty x and Betty y are both F.
() In w, Betty is F.
Ordering supervaluationism rightly delivers the verdict that () is ordering supertrue in such circumstances. For any integers m > 0 and n < 0, {'In w, Betty m is F, ' 'In w, Betty n is F '} is a cutset of the merely partial preorder that ranks the interpretations of () in accordance with the absolute values associated with the names of the subjects. () is ordering supertrue iff all the interpretations bounded from below by some ≲ cutset are true.
Here is a more complicated example which currently popular ways of implementing supervaluationism mishandle. How should we generalize a theory that presupposes that an ordering is total, to create a theory that can handle incomparability? Conventional wisdom has it that we should supervaluate according to a familiar recipe: "any partially de ned semantic interpretation will correspond to a class of completely de ned interpretations-the class of all ways of arbitrarily completing it" (S , ) . In particular, Stalnaker holds that a counterfactual ' A > C ' is supertrue iff it is true relative to every total extension of the partial preorder putatively relevant to its evaluation.
De nition . ≲
* on a set S is a total extension of ≲ on S iff ≲ * is a total preorder on S and ∀x∀y(x ≲ y → x ≲ * y).
Lewis proves that-as long as the set of worlds comparable to the world of evaluation is nite-"a Cf. S , - and -. Other advocates of this approach include L , -, W- ,  and , , and W , . counterfactual is true on Pollock's or Kratzer's [partial preorder] semantics iff it is true on Lewis's or Stalnaker's [total preorder] semantics no matter how the missing comparisons are made" (, ) .
When in nitely many worlds are comparable to the world of evaluation we have no such guarantee. Suppose that in the world of evaluation (henceforth, i), the life of the unique universe has a beginning but not an end, and that we partition its life into years: year , year , year , . . . . Assume that any world w that contains exactly one universe the life of which exactly resembles years n and n + 1 of i is, in the sense relevant to the evaluation of counterfactuals, more similar to i than is a world the sole universe of which exactly resembles n or n + 1 but not both. Assume also, for simplicity, that worlds are otherwise incomparable to each other. So a world the universe of which exactly resembles years  and  of i is more similar to i than a world with only a counterpart of year , and neither is comparable to a world the universe of which exactly resembles years  and  of i. F  is an incomplete depiction of this partial preorder on worlds. e numbers indicate which years are included in the world. But according to the total preorder semantics of S  and L , supervaluated in the way that Stalnaker and Lewis endorse, () is wrongly not supertrue. is is because some total extensions of the partial similarity preorder ip back and forth, ad in nitum, between worlds in which the life of the universe is one year long and worlds in which it is two years long.
Ordering supervaluationism, by contrast, rightly delivers the verdict that () is ordering supertrue. Consider the obvious preorder isomorphism of F  on interpretations of (), rather than on worlds. at preorder ranks an interpretation of () according to which the world that includes years n and n + 1 is closest as a 'better' interpretation than any interpretation on which the Indeed, () remains anomalous for Stalnaker even aer supervaluating, because some total extensions of this partial preorder violate the limit assumption for counterfactuals. Whenever a partial preorder has in nitely many pairwise incomparabilities, some total extension of it violates the limit assumption.
closest world includes just year n or just year n + 1. So the cutset consisting of exactly the two year long universes provides interpretations of () such that on every interpretation at least as good as an interpretation in that cutset, () is true. So () is ordering supertrue. And ordering supervaluationism makes the right predictions even when for any given antecedent world another is closer.
Consider
() If the life of the universe had been nite, it would have been at least  years long.
ere is a cutset consisting of interpretations of () (to take just one example, the set of interpretations according to which a world including exactly  years is 'closest') such that on every interpretation at least as good as an interpretation in that cutset, () is true. So () is ordering supertrue.
. Ersatz fundamentality
So far I have focused on how limit assuming theories can be improved with the help of ordering supervaluationism. But in some cases ordering supervaluationism does not just strengthen a standing theory; it makes a signi cant impact on standing philosophical debates. I want to close with an illustrative case study, on contemporary debates over metaphysical fundamentality.
Many metaphysical theories talk about the relationship between the most fundamental level of reality and other levels of reality. But the assumption that there is a most fundamental level has come in for a drubbing over the last twenty years or so. Jonathan Schaffer, for example, draws dramatic conclusions from the possibility that for every ontological level another is more fundamental:
What would a metaphysic of in nite descent look like? e most striking feature of an in nite descent is that no level is special. In nite descent yields an egalitarian ontological attitude which is at home in the macro-world precisely because everything is macro. (, ) Schaffer's thought here is that all 'levels' must be the same, with respect to their fundamentality, unless they are at the bottom. A metaphysic of in nite descent takes away the bottom, leaving no most fundamental level and indeed no "special" level or levels whatsoever. ⁴ What happens if we apply ordering supervaluationism to a "metaphysic of in nite descent"? Suppose that the fundamentality preorder is total, and that there is some level, L, such that for each level at least as fundamental as L, the macro-world supervenes on the distribution of properties at that ⁴In his  Schaffer writes that "unlike bottomness, topness does not seem to carry ontological signi cance" (fn. ). For a very different view see his  and . level. en () is ordering supertrue, for () is true according to every interpretation that treats a level at least as fundamental as L as though it were most fundamental.
() e macro-world supervenes on the distribution of fundamental properties.
We can say this while agreeing with S  that no particular level is the special level in a metaphysic of in nite descent. Here is another application: some structural realists "see no reason to suppose that there are ultimate constituents of the world, which are not themselves to be understood in structural terms. … [I]t is turtles all the way down" (S , ) . If the macro-world supervenes on the 'most fundamental' structural facts relative to every level at least as fundamental as a given level L, then whether or not L is at the bottom, then () is ordering supertrue.
() e macro-world supervenes on the fundamental structural facts. So when we ask how things are with o at a world w we sometimes have to consider more than one counterpart of o in w. Nevertheless we talk in a way that brackets o's possible plurality at w: "What is o like at w?" In cases that call for ordering supervaluationism we have to consider in nitely many objects, of course, but the counterpart theorist is already committed to the existence of worlds in which in nitely many potential o counterparts are tied for best. Counterpart theorists make these kinds of commitments because they think we should reject the broadly haecceitistic intuition that we look to just one object in w whenever we ask how things are with o at w. As Sider puts it, e counterpart theorist must admit that pretty much any answer to [questions about modality and persistence] could, in principle, be correct, given an appropriate choice of counterpart relation … [T]he counterpart theorist cannot accept the existence of 'deep' 'non-conventional' facts about de re persistence and modality … But the non-existence of such facts is precisely the moral of the puzzles of persistence and their modal analogs. (b, ) us counterpart theorists want to preserve ordinary modal talk while accommodating the possibility that o has multiple counterparts in a given world. Ordering supervaluationism lets us preserve talk about the most fundamental level while accommodating the possibility that there are yet more and more fundamental levels. Both kinds of talk are innocuous. is maneuver might be less attractive in other domains, so I think it is worth emphasizing that we can always choose whether or not to apply ordering supervaluationism to a particular case. Someone who favors epistemicism about vagueness might well favor supervaluationism about ctional characters; similarly, someone who applies ordering supervaluationism in her counterpart theory or in her conception of practical reason might have principled reasons to refrain from applying it elsewhere.
ese are tools to be used where they are helpful and to be learned from where they turn out not to be helpful. My aim here has been to display some of the utility of ordering supervaluationism by defending its application on the behalf of counterpart theorists and metaphysicians who leave open  the possibility that there is no most fundamental or "ground" level. I leave detailed consideration of other potential applications to future work.
